February 15th, 2023

​United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Percy Taylor,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
James LeBlanc, Secretary,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:21-CV-72

Constitutional Law:

"qualified immunity protects government officials
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quotation omitted). “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity
unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. “Both steps in the qualified immunity
analysis are questions of law.” Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir.
2013). We are free to decide which prong of the qualified immunity analysis
to address first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242 (“[T]he judges of the district
courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position to determine the
order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient
disposition of each [qualified immunity] case.”).
We proceed to consider whether Secretary LeBlanc’s “actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. “The second prong of the qualified
immunity test is better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the
allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of
the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was
objectively unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.”
Hare, 135 F.3d at 326 (emphasis omitted).
Case: 21-30625 Document: 00516645415 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/14/2023
No. 21-30625
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It is clearly established that inmates have the right to timely release
from prison consistent with the terms of their sentences. See Crittindon, 37
F.4th at 188; Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. Taylor’s claim against Secretary
LeBlanc nevertheless fails because he has forfeited any argument that the
Secretary’s conduct was objectively unreasonable.
The objectively unreasonable standard is not “that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful; but it is . . . that in the light of pre-existing law
the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)
(citation omitted). The critical consideration is fair warning. See id. at 739–
41. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable official that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at
236.
Taylor does not present any meritorious argument that Secretary
LeBlanc acted in an objectively unreasonable manner in this case.
To begin with, he argues that whether Secretary LeBlanc acted
objectively unreasonably is a fact question not amenable to appellate review
at this stage in the proceedings. But we have long held precisely the opposite.
Whether “a given course of conduct would be objectively unreasonable in
light of clearly established law” is a “purely legal question” and plainly
within our jurisdiction on interlocutory review. Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d
337, 347 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 503 (noting both steps
of the qualified immunity analysis “are questions of law”).
To the extent that Taylor argues the merits, it’s inadequately briefed.
Taylor’s entire presentation on the issue of objective unreasonableness
amounts to just this single conclusory statement: “It is inherently
Case: 21-30625 Document: 00516645415 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/14/2023
No. 21-30625
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unreasonable for the secretary . . . to fail to enact policies and procedures to
ensure the prompt release of inmates who have served their sentences in
accordance to law.” A single, unsupported sentence isn’t enough to
adequately brief the issue. See Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publ’g Co., Inc., 931 F.3d
375, 382 n.6 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that when an “issue [is] inadequately
briefed, it is forfeited”). To be sure, we have said that forfeiture principles
may apply “more leniently when the party who fails to brief an issue is the
appellee” rather than the appellant. Hernandez v. Garcia Pena, 820 F.3d 782,
786 n.3 (5th Cir. 2016). But Taylor bears the burden on the issue of objective
unreasonableness. See, e.g., Angulo v. Brown, 978 F.3d 942, 949 (5th Cir.
2020) (“The plaintiff has the burden to negate a properly raised defense of
qualified immunity.”). And he has not meaningfully briefed that issue. See,
e.g., Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 713 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir.
2013) (applying forfeiture to the appellee because an issue “has not been
meaningfully briefed”).
We reverse



www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-30625-CV0.pdf